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Abstract
This paper uses the longitudinal aspect of the Health and Retirement Study to
explore the characteristics associated with reversals in retirement (referred to here as
“unretirement”). Through the use of survival time analysis, this paper shows that
health insurance status and its source are significant predictors of unretirement deci-
sions. The relationship is important as the potential impacts of the Affordable Care
Act are considered. By comparing the role of health insurance provision to the impact
of financial “shocks”, the analysis finds that insurance is equally important as other
financial explanations for retirement reversals. The analysis also shows that health in-
surance source plays a particularly important role for those who were previously open
to the idea of working in retirement while they were still working.
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1 Introduction
Most research in the area of retirement has focused on an individual’s binary choice to retire
or to continue working, with much of the debate among economists centered on which model
best fits retirement decision behavior. This line of research often neglects the fact that an
individual’s working career does not always end with retirement. A non-trivial share of re-
tirees choose to return to work either on a part-time or full-time basis after fully retiring,
or return to full-time work after partially retiring (collectively referred to in this paper as
“unretiring”). Based on estimates using Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data from
1992 through 2006, 25 to 35 percent of retirees later reverse their retirement decisions, which
is similar to previous findings by Ruhm (1990) using the 1970’s Retirement History Longitu-
dinal Survey (RHLS).1 As the demographic make-up of the labor force in the United States
changes, it is important to understand what factors may influence the movement of retirees
in and out of the labor force. A better understanding of retirement reversals should help
inform policy decision-making and identify the potential impacts of macroeconomic changes.
One important policy question that needs to be addressed is how the implementation of
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) might impact the labor market, especially among the large
group of workers from the baby-boom generation that are approaching or have entered their
normal retirement ages. In the analysis that follows, I focus specifically on the role of health
insurance sources and find that they are a strong predictor of future retirement reversals.
Though research focusing on the timing of initial retirement has been prolific and focused
very explicitly on the role of health insurance provision, research on retirement reversals
has been much more limited. Early influential models of retirement behavior incorporated
retirement decisions as a consuming state and did not allow for retirees to reverse their deci-
sions (Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), Stock and Wise (1990), and Lumsdaine and Mitchell
(1999), for example). Other models recognized unretirement but usually did not attempt to
predict reversals with their models due to the complexity and assumed relative infrequency
1The RHLS followed a random sample of individuals aged 58-63 in 1969 until the survey ended in 1979.
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of the event (Berkovec and Stern (1991) and Rust and Phelan (1997), for example). There
is a small literature that examines retirement reversals. Ruhm (1990) found that those with
pensions and higher levels of education were less likely to unretire than others when control-
ling for income, age, and gender but omitting health insurance and health care costs. A pair
of recent studies have also examined unretirement patterns but have either rejected outright
or not explored the role of health insurance provision in retirement reversals. Specifically,
Maestas (2010) identified pre-retirement expectations as a primary predictor of unretirement
and found that health insurance provision (as measured by the loss of health insurance) and
other financial changes at the time of retirement were not significant indicators. Maestas
and Li (2007) employed a hazard model approach and found a statistically significant role
for health insurance sources, but did not examine this result in detail or identify the con-
tradiction to the findings in Maestas (2010) as it was an ancillary finding to the main focus
of their study.2 The lack of focus on health insurance concerns in this literature is surpris-
ing given the strong link found between retirement timing and health insurance availability.
Previous research has found that potential retirees are from 30 to almost 70 percent more
likely to retire if their employer offers retiree health insurance (RHI) than if they do not (a
few examples include Karoly and Rogowski (1994), Gruber and Madrian (1995), Johnson et
al. (2003), Kapur and Rogowski (2011), Marton and Woodbury (2012), Nyce et al. (2013),
Shoven and Slavov (2014), Fitzpatrick (2014), and Congdon-Hohman (2015)). This paper
puts health insurance at the center of the examination and compares the results to other
potential predictors of unretirement.
A separate and more in-depth examination of the role of health insurance in unretirement
is important for a number of reasons. First and foremost, this study finds that the importance
of health insurance sources in predicting unretirement is on par with financial concerns
(such as household wealth and pensions) and cannot be simply explained away with pre-
2The focus of their examination was “psychological burnout” caused by employment stress and measured
by survey questions regarding exhaustion. As retirees’ “burnout” level dissipates after leaving their employer,
their theory suggests unretirement may become optimal.
3
retirement expectations as found in earlier work. Prior to the implementation of the ACA,
the expectations of retirees regarding health insurance provision would be quite different
from other financial measures due to the unfamiliarity with the real cost of premiums, the
direct costs for health care, and the high variability of health care costs before one reaches
Medicare eligibility age. Additionally, retirement-aged individuals may have faced unforeseen
difficulties finding affordable health insurance that is not provided by an employer or the
government. The ACA changes this landscape dramatically by providing more cost certainty
to all consumers of non-employer based health insurance and by guaranteeing that no one will
be refused health insurance or charged more due to pre-existing conditions. The findings of
this study suggest that post-retirement behavior may change due to the changing landscape
of health insurance provision and this should be accounted for when modeling labor force
participation and other fiscal impacts for the ACA.
For this examination, I will focus my empirical analysis on retirees from the HRS prior to
the 2008 recession and the passage of the ACA to limit confounding other factors during this
traumatic economic period. The HRS, produced by the Institute for Social Research at the
University of Michigan, provides a unique opportunity to study the role of health insurance
in unretirement decisions. Due to the longitudinal nature of the survey, individuals can
be followed and examined over a fourteen-year period. I have used a survival time model
(often referred to as a hazard model) to show the relative importance of the provision of
health insurance and other characteristics in a retiree’s decision to unretire. This approach
allows fluid characteristics such as a spouse’s retirement status, health, health insurance, and
wealth to vary with time, something unexamined in previous studies on retirement reversals
which have used stationary models and characteristics only at the time of retirement.
Section 2 describes recent trends in health insurance premium costs and employer provi-
sion of insurance as a retirement benefit. Section 3 describes the HRS and the sample used.
Section 4 defines retirement and unretirement. Section 5 discusses the general methodol-




Health insurance provision for working-aged Americans is centered around employer provided
health insurance (EPHI). The majority of workers receive health insurance from either their
own or their spouses’ employers. When Americans reach 65 years of age, they become eligible
for a federal government health insurance program, called Medicare, as long as they have
worked ten years in a qualifying job (which most do). Medicare is available prior to age 65
only for those with a qualifying disability. If workers choose to retire before they reach 65
years of age, a number of insurance options exist in addition to the choice to go uninsured.
Some employers offer to continue to provide health insurance to retirees who have worked
for the employer for a certain number of years. I refer to this as an offer of retiree health
insurance (RHI). The level of premium subsidization depends on the employer’s specific
benefits, but these programs tend to be a retiree’s least expensive option due to the risk
pooling over all of an employer’s employees. Unfortunately for retirees, RHI benefits received
at retirement are not guaranteed to continue throughout retirement (unlike pension benefits
which are insured through the federal government). A Labor Department report stated that
2 percent of 1994 retirees lost their promised retirement health insurance benefits in the
previous year (Government Accountability Office, 1998) and a similar decline of 2 percent
was found between 2013 and 2014 in a survey of employers by Towers Watson/National
Business Group on Health (2014). Though this number is small, that report was issued at
a time of economic expansion; more recent, anecdotal evidence suggests that an increasing
number of firms are eliminating health insurance benefits to currently retired individuals.
The role of EPHI and RHI has not been changed dramatically by the ACA.
The major implications of the ACA for retirement planning revolve around the fact
that the law guarantees issue of non-group health insurance for anyone not covered by an
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employer or government health insurance program and that the rates would not depend on
pre-existing medical conditions. Prior to the ACA, those who retired before they reached
Medicare eligibility age and did not have an offer of RHI may still have had access to health
insurance through temporary continuation programs (“COBRA” benefits) or the expensive
private, non-group health insurance market. Specifically, COBRA benefits allow individuals
to remain on former employers’ health insurance plans for 18 months following separation
of employment, but they must pay the full cost of the insurance to the employer plus a two
percent administration fee.3 Though it is hard to estimate the average cost of private, non-
group health insurance due to the high variability in the terms of each policy, these plans
tended to have higher deductibles and co-payments for services than employer provided
plans. Furthermore, insurance companies in most states retained the option to limit benefits
for pre-existing conditions and to deny coverage to individuals whom they deem too risky.
Examination of insurance companies’ offer rates have found that companies rejected 10 to
14 percent of all applicants (Pauly and Nichols, 2002; Merlis, 2005) and up to 37 percent
of those with pre-existing conditions (Pollitz et al., 2001). The Congressional Budget Office
(2005) estimated that the average annual premium for a private, non-group plan was a third
higher than the average total premium cost for EPHI in 2002 despite the fact that this
estimate does not control for the level of coverage (copayments and deductibles).
If near-retirement aged individuals choose to go without insurance, they face higher
medical costs on average than younger Americans, with much higher variability (Gruber and
Madrian, 1996). Tabulations from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) show that
the 2005 mean medical expenditure for individuals between 55 and 64 years of age to be over
fifty percent higher than for individuals between the ages of 45 and 54 at $5923 and $3775,
3These are commonly referred to COBRA benefits due to the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986 that granted this benefit. A few states have extended the benefits beyond 18
months for all employees in the state (CT, MA, NH, NJ, NY, TX, MN, ND, SD, CA, and NV extend health
insurance benefits to 36 months, FL to 29 months, and IL to 24 months). Six states have addressed the
concerns of retirees specifically by requiring former employers of retirees who are near Medicare eligible age
to offer continuation coverage until they reach the age of 65 (IL, LA, MD, MO, NH, and OR) (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2007). Unfortunately, the unrestricted HRS data does not include information on respondents’
state of residence.
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respectively.4 Medical expenditures are also growing faster than inflation. Using the MEPS
data, the average medical expenditures between 1996 and 2005 increased at an annualized
rate of six percent per year for individuals between 55 and 66 years of age, while annual
inflation ranged between 1.6 and 4.1 percent in the same period. Data for 2006 showed
medical costs increasing at twice the rate of inflation (Poisal, 2007).
The implementation of the ACA may be particularly important for retirees given the
trends in employer health insurance provision in the decade prior. EPHI and RHI have
been on a slow decline over the fifteen years that the Kaiser Family Foundation and Health
Research and Education Trust have been tracking offer rates by employers (Kaiser Family
Foundation and Health Research and Education Trust, 2014). The survey has found the
percentage of employers offering EPHI is down from 68 percent in 2000 to 59 percent in 2007
to 55 percent in 2014. Among large employers offering EPHI, the rate of RHI offers went
down from 66 percent in 1988 to 40 percent in 1999 and 25 percent in 2014. A larger study
using MEPS found that only one-quarter of private-sector employees were working at firms
that offered retiree health benefits in 2003 compared to 32 percent in 1997 (Buchmueller et
al., 2006). Though the long-term effects of the ACA are still unclear, initial indications are
that the law has not dramatically slowed the previous downward trend in offer rates of EPHI
and RHI.
3 Data
The analysis that follows uses detailed longitudinal data on a nationally representative sam-
ple of American households from the University of Michigan’s Health and Retirement Study.
The initial cohort of the HRS included households where at least one member was between
the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992. A new cohort, labeled the War Baby Cohort, was added in
1998 and included households in which one spouse was between the ages of 51 and 56 at
4MEPS is available through the U.S. Department of Human Services’ Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/mepsweb/index.jsp
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the time of their first interview. The HRS includes data from re-interviews of respondents
that occur every two years, with the most recent interview “wave” analyzed here occurring
in 2006, the final wave before the economic turmoil began in 2008. The HRS data used here
is available through the Survey Research Center at the Institute for Social Research and the
RAND Center for the Study of Aging (St. Clair, 2008).
Though the HRS includes over sixteen thousand respondents, this study will only ex-
amine a restricted subset based on their observable characteristics and retirement timing.
Specifically, I eliminate those who were not age eligible for either cohort (respondents who
are younger or older than their age-eligible spouses, for example) and those who become
deceased or otherwise attrited during the sample period in order to have a full set of obser-
vations for those remaining in the sample. Because this study uses employment information
from the wave prior to retirement, individuals were also required to be working in the first
wave that their cohort was surveyed. Finally, respondents must have been observed to retire
and have appeared in at least one proceeding wave. With this restriction, each respondent
had at least one opportunity to be observed to reverse their retirement decision. Upon un-
retirement, respondents are not reintroduced if they retire again. The final analysis sample
includes 3,421 HRS respondents which I observe for an average of 2.7 waves after retirement
before reversing their retirement or the end of the observation period.
4 Definitions and Summary Statistics
In the HRS, individuals are given multiple opportunities to identify themselves as “retired”.
As in much of the literature, full and partial retirement will be defined by both the amount
worked by a respondent and their self-reported retirement status. Those who work full-
time (defined as 35 hours or more per week and at least 36 weeks in the last year) are not
considered retired regardless of their self-designation. Those working part-time are identified
as partially retired if they self-report their retirement status as retired or partially retired.
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Finally, anyone not working and self-reporting being retired is considered “fully retired” while
those not working and not identifying themselves as retired (the unemployed, disabled, and
those not in the labor force but not retired) will be excluded from the sample. The alternative
of using self-reported identifiers alone has very little impact on the results that are presented
below.
When defining retirement and unretirement, one must consider how to treat partial re-
tirement. For the purposes of this study partial retirement will be considered a form of
retirement based on the fact that the respondent has made a classification that any work
she is doing is part of her retirement plan. Since a response of partial retirement is used to
identify the onset of retirement, a “directional definition” of unretirement is used. Under
this definition, a respondent would have to move from a higher to a lower state of retirement
to be considered unretired. The highest state of retirement for these purposes would be full
retirement, followed by partial retirement and not retired. For example, if a respondent was
fully retired in the previous wave, she would be considered unretired if she moved to either
a partially retired or not retired state, but only a movement to a not retired state would be
considered unretiring for a respondent who was previously partially retired. In addition to
matching the subjective views of the individual respondent, this definition is also consistent
with the work of Maestas (2010) and will allow for a reasonable comparison of results in a
later section.5
Table 1 presents the unretirement hazard rates following retirement.6 The hazard rate
is highest between the first observed retirement wave and the second wave (a period of two
years) at 18.5 percent. The unretirement hazard falls consistently following the first wave
after retirement, but over 5 percent of retirees will unretire between 6 and 8 years after they
are first observed to retire. In total, over 31 percent of those in the sample were observed to
5A weakness of this definition is that an individual working part-time and classified as partially retired
can unretire without changing their work level by simply changing their self-reported retirement status. The
same is not true for a full-time worker since the definition does not allow a full-time worker to be classified
as retired.
6Hazard rates are defined as the rate that an event occurs (here unretirement) in a time period, given
that it has not occurred prior to that time period.
9
unretire in some wave. Both values are similar to the rates found by Ruhm (1990) (25 to 35
percent using the 1970’s RHLS) and Maestas (2010) (24 percent using the HRS but limiting
the observation period to five years following retirement). The number of observations not
unretiring or attriting (due to end of observation period) is also included in Table 1 to provide
a sense of the attrition rate.
Though the key focus for this study is the role of health insurance sources in regard to
unretirement behavior, Table 2 first looks at the role of demographic (age, gender, race,
marital status, educational attainment, and Census region), health (own and spouse’s self-
rated health), and financial (total wealth at retirement) factors. The table compares the
mean values of these factors at the time of retirement for those who are permanent retirees (at
least within the period of observation) and future unretirees. At retirement, future unretirees
were statistically significantly younger, male, more highly educated, and had better self-rated
health. There was no statistical difference between the two groups based on marital status
but respondents were less likely to unretire in the future if their spouses were also retired.
There was not a statistical difference between groups based on their spouses’ self-rated health,
race, and region (with the exception of a respondent being statistically less likely to unretire
if he or she lives in the north Census region). Though there was not a statistical difference
in total household wealth between groups, permanent retirees were significantly more likely
to report receiving a pension at their retirement wave than were future unretirees.7
Since this study is focused primarily on the role of health insurance in the decision to
unretire, Table 2 also presents the means for a number of health insurance sources at the
time of retirement. While Maestas (2010) included only the loss of health insurance at retire-
ment and Maestas and Li (2007) included a binary measure for whether a respondent would
have group health insurance in the next wave if they were not working (where group health
insurance included government health insurance, RHI, or insurance through a spouse’s em-
7The inclusion of pensions is particularly important when examining the impact of health insurance on
retirement reversal decisions. Specifically, RHI might be correlated with retiree pensions. In the analysis
that follows, pensions will be included in all specifications.
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ployer), this study separates health insurance sources and uses the current source to examine
its influence on unretirement before the following wave. Health insurance sources are divided
into five categories based on expected cost and risk of large health care expenditures: pro-
vision through a governmental program; provision through an employer or union subsidized
program (“subsidized” EPHI tend to have the lowest consumer paid premiums among the
private health insurance options); provision through an employer or union based program in
which the recipient pays the full cost (“unsubsidized” EPHI); provision through a private,
non-group health insurer (highest premiums, some exposure to large health care expenditures
if there was a pre-existing condition); and those without health insurance (high exposure
to large health care expenditures). Subsidized or unsubsidized EPHI could be provided by
either the respondent’s current or former employer, or by his or her spouse’s employer. Ta-
ble 2 presents the share of respondents reporting each of these health insurance sources at
the time they were first observed as retired. Future unretirees were significantly less likely to
report subsidized EPHI or government provided health insurance and more likely to report
having no health insurance or private, non-group health insurance than were permanent re-
tirees. Statistically, there is not a significant difference in the rate that future unretirees and
permanent retirees report having unsubsidized EPHI.
Additional attention is paid in this study to a specific question in the initial HRS wave
(1992) that asked respondents whether they planned to do “paid work in retirement.”
Though this does not directly refer to unretirement since a transition through partial re-
tirement would also seem to be included in this expectation, it has been the focus of previ-
ous work on the subject of unretirement and has proven to be quite powerful in predicting
retirement reversals (Maestas, 2010). Table 2 show that this continues to hold true in the
extended dataset used here, at least in comparison of means, as future unretirees were sig-




To allow for changes in key variables across time, this study will primarily use a survival time
analysis to identify the impact of key static and dynamic characteristics on the unretirement
hazard rate. The survival time methodology accounts for censoring (in this case from the
end of survey) and for varying lengths of observation. It is also better equipped than static
models to evaluate the effects of shocks and other changes to a respondent’s circumstances
throughout retirement. This design element is one of the reasons survival time models are
commonly used in studies of unemployment and welfare spell duration as many individuals
do not become employed or do not exit welfare before the observation period ends. This
study assumes a parametric hazard function and uses the Weibull distribution as the form of
the baseline hazard, which will allow for negative duration dependence (Wooldridge, 2002).8
As evidence of the importance of allowing key indicators to vary with time, Table 3 sum-
marizes the changes in health insurance sources between each respondent’s retirement wave
and the period of observed, continued retirement. Of the nine percent of respondents who
report no health insurance at their retirement wave, only 36 percent report being uninsured
in a subsequent wave. Among those who report private, non-group health insurance at their
retirement wave, ten percent later report being uninsured. Similarly, five percent of those
with EPHI at retirement that is not subsidized by an employer or union later report being
without health insurance and 13 percent later report having non-group, private health in-
surance. Though 44 percent of respondents report employer subsidized EPHI at retirement,
four percent later report being uninsured, seven percent report having private, non-group
insurance, and eleven percent report having EPHI that is not subsidized by an employer
during some future wave of their retirement. Not surprisingly, government programs tend to
8Other parametric forms were also evaluated based on their goodness of fit. The Weibull distribution
had the best fit among proportional hazard metrics as evaluated by their Akaike Information Criteria (AIC)
values. The log-normal and log-logistic distributions had slightly better fits but are limited to the harder to
interpret accelerated failure-time metric. Calculating the mean marginal effects for each type of distribution
suggests that the difference in results are minimal with no large changes in magnitudes and no changes in
statistical significance. Semi-parametric forms are not used because of the large number of duration ties in
the two year periodic data used in this analysis.
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have the highest continuation rate throughout retirement, with no more than three percent
reporting any other insurance source during their retirement.
The survival time analysis employed in this study examines the unretirement hazard
between the current wave and the following wave, given that a respondent has not unretired
prior to the current wave. Current conditions are used in the analysis except when examining
changes in levels between waves (changes in characteristics such as health or wealth for
example), which are measured between the previous wave and the current wave. In addition
to the traditional presentation of the results of survival time analysis results as hazard ratios,
this study will also present the mean marginal effect (MME) on the predicted hazard from a
one unit change in each characteristic for an easier interpretation of the results in our initial
examinations.
6 Estimation Results
In order to give a general view of which characteristics are broadly associated with unre-
tirement, Table 4 presents the results of a survival time analysis when only demographic,
wealth, and health variables are included. The dependent variable is whether a retiree un-
retires before the next wave given that he or she is still retired in the current wave. Column
[1] presents the hazard ratio and column [2] presents the mean marginal effects (MMEs) on
the predicted hazard. Both columns show the same pattern since they are simply differ-
ent ways to present the same underlying estimation results. Respondents are more likely
to reverse their retirement with each addition year of age at retirement but that likelihood
drops significantly as respondents reach the critical ages of 62 (earliest age of Social Security
eligibility) and 65 (earliest age of Medicare eligibility). While gender and marital status
alone do not appear to be major factors when predicting unretirements, married men are
six percentage points more likely to unretire than the baseline group (unmarried women),
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though the pattern is reversed if the spouse is also retired. 9 If a respondent rates his or her
health as “poor” or “fair” on a five-point scale, he or she is on average 10 percentage points
less likely to unretire before the next wave, but that value is cut in half if the respondent is
also a male. A spouse’s health does not change the predicted hazard rate by a statistically
significant amount.
The results in Table 4 also suggest that wealth and educational attainment are not strong
predictors of respondents’ unretirement hazard rates but the receipt of a pension has a sta-
tistically significant and negative impact on the likelihood of a retirement reversal. Wealth
at the time of retirement has surprisingly little importance when predicting unretirements,
while those with an educational attainment of a high school diploma or more are not sta-
tistically different from one another in regards to their unretirement rates. Those who do
not obtain a high school diploma or General Educational Development (GED) certification
are three percentage points less likely to unretire than those with a high school diploma
or GED (which is significantly different from zero at the five percent level). Among other
demographic variables, only respondents reporting their race as black and those living in the
Northeast Census Division (not shown) have significantly different mean predicted hazard
rates than the baseline group (non-hispanic, caucasians from the South Census Region).
Health insurance sources are introduced to the survival time analysis in Table 5. Though
not reported in the table, the MMEs for demographic, health, and wealth factors do not
change dramatically when health insurance sources are introduced. The results for the
four included health insurance categories show a clear pattern in relation to the omitted
group, those reporting subsidized EPHI. Given that government insurance programs tend
to be more secure and often cheaper than RHI programs or insurance through a spouses
employer or union, it is not surprising that retirees with this type of insurance are over
twenty percentage points less likely to reverse their retirement decision. Those with less
stable and likely higher cost insurance sources are more likely to unretire. Those with an
9The MMEs and standard errors for interaction terms reported in all tables have been adjusted to reflect
the true magnitude of the interaction effect described in Ai and Norton (2003).
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employer provided plan but who pay the full cost have a three percentage point higher rate
of unretirement, though this is not statistically significant at traditional levels. There is a
four percentage point increase in the hazard rate for those with non-group, private health
insurance and an almost six percentage point increase for those with no health insurance,
with the former statistically significant at the ten percent level and the later at the five
percent level. In terms of magnitude, these mean marginal effects are on par with that of
retirement pensions for the retiree.
In light of the Great Recession, there has been a great deal of commentary on the level of
retirement savings individuals have as they prepare to retire and other shocks that might have
occured in this period (see Brady (2012) and Ondrich and Falevich (2014)). Though I have
included income at retirement and the receipt of a pension in the preliminary analysis, Table 6
adds a number of wave-to-wave changes that might predict a reversal in retirements that
would not be identified in a static model based on conditions at an individual’s retirement.
In this table and those that follow, only the hazard ratio results will be presented. Though
these shocks are interesting, it should be noted that the inclusion of these shocks has almost
no discernible effect on the magnitude or significance of the hazard ratios of the health
insurance source indicators.
The impact of financial shocks are examined in columns [1] and [2] of Table 6. In column
[1], large shocks to total wealth are included as well as steep increases in out-of-pocket medical
(OOPM) expenses. Shocks in these cases are defined as a 50% decline in total wealth or a
50% increase in OOPM between waves above a nominal threshold of $10,000 for wealth and
$2,000 for OOPM. Though wealth at retirement is not a predictor of unretirement, a shock
to total wealth has a positive and significant hazard ratio suggesting a significantly higher
rate of unretirement for those who experience such a decrease in their wealth during their
retirement. The shock in OOPM does not have a statistically significant impact, possibly
because it is so closely linked to health which has already been accounted for elsewhere. The
results in column [2] separate total wealth shock into shocks to the housing and non-housing
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components reported wealth in the HRS. The 2008 recession included negative shocks to
both housing and stock values and based on the results here, we would expect either to have
significantly increased the likelihood of an unretirement.
Table 6 also examines other factors that have been discussed anecdotally as being on
the rise during the Great Recession: children moving back in with parents and individuals
retiring after being forced out of their jobs and facing weak demand for their skills. To
address the first, column [3] includes changes in household size between the previous wave
and the current wave. Though this does not explicitly capture the narrative of children
moving back in with parents, it would capture the results of such changes. When the
number of household members decreases, there is a statistically significant increase in an
individual’s hazard rate but not in the case of an increase in the household size of either one
member or two or more members. This suggests that the departure of a family member,
most likely a spouse, could drive retirees out of retirement but additional family members
have a much less certain impact. The later may be due to the inability to identify when
family members move in because of financial hardships and when retirees move in with their
children do to non-financial needs. Column [4] looks at two HRS questions that look at
the conditions at the time of retirement. Specifically, this analysis includes the answers to
questions regarding whether the respondent felt “forced to retire” by their employer and
whether they were given an “early retirement offer” (ERO) at the time they retired. The
first was not associated with a change in retirement behavior but those reporting an ERO
had statistically significant lower hazard ratios than those who did not.
7 Work Expectations before Retirement
One concern regarding the above analysis is that unretirement might simply be the result of
a planned return to work following retirement. As mentioned earlier, this was the findings of
Maestas (2010) in a static model using the first three waves of the HRS, where characteristics
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were valued at their retirement wave level. Specifically, Maestas (2010) found a 1992 question
asking respondents about their work expectations in retirement to be the most important
predictor of future unretirement. The question was only asked in 1992 so there is not an
opportunity for this response to be measured at the time of retirement. To address this
finding and link it to the health insurance source findings above, I include the response
to the model and, alternatively, separate the analysis based on the response. Because this
question was only asked in the 1992 wave of the HRS, the sample used is limited only to
respondents in the Initial HRS cohort(the majority of respondents). The results in column
[1] of Table 7 show that the results are not dramatically different when limited to this reduced
sample, though the statistical significance of non-group, private health insurance falls below
the ten percent level.
Column [2] of Table 7 presents the results when responses to the question about doing
“planned work in retirement” are added to the earlier specification. When this expectation
indicator is added, the key hazard ratios decrease slightly in magnitude but remain substan-
tial and statistically significant at the ten percent level if the respondent has no insurance,
and remains insignificant at the ten percent level if they have non-group or unsubsidized
employer provided health insurance. The expectation variable is significant at the one per-
cent level and has a large hazard ratio compared to those of the health insurance variables.
Though Maestas (2010) did not find the same significant impact of health insurance in a
static model, the finding that work expectation in retirement are a very good predictor of
future behavior hold up in the more flexible, hazard model.
The findings regarding the expectation of work in retirement are worth further explo-
ration. Over 70 percent of respondents in 1992 answered that they planned to do some
paid work in retirement, but since the unretirement rate is much lower than this, it is in-
formative to examine what factors are associated with retirement reversals amongst those
who had different expectations of their retirement labor force participation. Columns [3]
and [4] of Table 7 separately examine those who answered yes to the 1992 question and
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those who answer no. Though not shown, the two groups have very similar hazard ratios for
the demographic variable explored in Table 2. More interestingly, they have very different
hazard ratios for their health insurance source variables. While the respondents who did not
plan to work in retirement do not appear to have a higher hazard rate when uninsured or
possessing non-group health insurance, both of those sources lead to a significant difference
in the hazard rate for those who did plan to work in retirement. This result suggests that
though not everyone is open to working in retirement, health insurance sources are strongly
linked to the decision to reverse a retirement for those who are considering future work as
part of their retirement.
8 Conclusion
Despite the fact that unretirement is an important and relatively common phenomenon
among retirement-aged Americans, it has been largely ignored in the existing literature.
This paper has set out to both identify important factors in the decision to reverse re-
tirement decision and identify the potential channels in which the ACA’s reform of health
insurance markets could potentially influence these decisions. In addition to linking retire-
ment reversals to a number of traits including gender roles, the influence of coordinated
retirements, and health concerns, the analysis found that the relative importance of retirees’
health insurance sources was similar to that of other purely financial measures such as pen-
sions and total wealth. Similarly, though less stark, retirees who obtained health insurance
from the private, non-group source were also more likely to reverse their retirement, and
statistically significantly so if they were already open to the idea of doing work in retirement
before retiring. The purchase of unsubsidized health insurance through an employer also
had a positive link to future unretirement, but not at a statistically significant level in most
of analysis above. These findings suggest that the more accessible and lower cost insurance
options provided under the ACA might lead to fewer retirement reversals than under the old
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regime.
The findings here suggest that previous retirement models should be modified to include
the option of “unretirement” to truly capture retirement behavior. Models will need to
include both the motivations behind anticipating a future return to work when current work
is more lucrative (as done in Maestas and Li (2007)) and the role that health insurance plays
in continued labor force decisions after retirement. Changes to the existing models will allow
policy makers to better evaluate the impact of changes to the health care payment system in
the United States. The implications of changes to the health care system have been studied in
the context of the choice to retire, but not in the area of a retiree’s decision to return to work.
The results of this study suggest that the more accessible health insurance markets mandated
under the Affordable Care Act (which would be most similar to an employer provided health
plan not subsidized by the employer) would decrease the likelihood of unretirement, but
not by as much as a government run program (similar to Medicare or subsidized employer
provided plans) funded by tax revenues. On the other hand, a policy that increased the
eligibility age for the Medicare program may influence both the timing of initial retirement
but also the likelihood that retirees might later reverse their retirement.
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Comparison of Characteristics at Retirement
Permanent Retirees Future Unretirees t-stat
Age in Years 61.6 60.8 5.72
Male 45.5% 51.0% -2.98
Married or ‘Partnered’, including
0.759 0.776 -1.06
Absent Spouse
Respondent (R) and Spouse retired
40.2% 33.9% 3.54
at R’s Retirement Wave
Self-rated ‘Poor’ or ‘Fair’ Health 24.0% 14.9% 6.08
Spouse’s Self-rated ‘Poor’ or ’Fair’ Health 14.9% 13.9% 0.76
Total Wealth (in millions) in 2000 $’s 0.370 0.418 -1.73
R Receives Pension 36.4% 33.2% 1.83
R has less than High School
19.9% 16.5% 2.37
Diploma or GED
R has High School Diploma or GED 39.7% 37.8% 1.04
R has Some College but No Degree 20.0% 22.2% -1.46
R has College Degree or More 20.5% 23.6% -2.05
R Reports Being White 83.0% 81.8% 0.86
R Reports Being Black 14.1% 15.4% -0.97
R Reports Being ‘Other Race’ 2.9% 2.9% 0.09
R Reports Being Hispanic 6.4% 5.7% 0.80
North Census Region 16.7% 13.9% 2.08
Midwest Census Region 26.5% 28.5% -1.24
South Census Region 41.0% 41.3% -0.19
West Census Region 15.8% 16.1% -0.22
R Has No Health Insurance 8.4% 11.5% -2.89
R Buys Private Health Insurance 6.8% 10.1% -3.41
Unsubsidized EPHI 11.4% 10.1% 1.14
Subsidized EPHI 42.8% 45.9% -1.71
Governmental Program 30.7% 22.4% 5.02




Note: “Subsidized” and “unsubsidized” employer provided health insurance (EPHI) refers to





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Age in Years at Retirement Wave
1.248*** 0.0309***
[0.0185] [0.00201]
Age 62 to 64 at Retirement
0.273*** -0.180***
[0.0252] [0.0129]












Respondent (R) and Spouse Were 0.589*** -0.0795***
Retired in Previous Wave [0.0431] [0.00894]
Self-rated ‘Poor’ or ‘Fair’ Health
0.471*** -0.0963***
[0.0633] [0.0119]
Male and Self-rated ‘Poor’ 1.455** 0.0430**
or ‘Fair’ Health [0.258] [0.0179]
Spouse’s Self-rated ‘Poor’ 1.13 0.0199
or ‘Fair’ Health [0.149] [0.0209]
Male and Spouse’s Self-rated ‘Poor’ 0.775 -0.0397
or ‘Fair’ Health [0.148] [0.0270]
Total Wealth (in millions) at 1.03 0.00447
Retirement in 2000 Dollars [0.0456] [0.00635]
R Receives a Pension
0.734*** -0.0467***
[0.0498] [0.00869]
R has Less than High School 0.817** -0.0294**
Diploma or GED Certificate [0.0836] [0.0115]
R has Some College but No Degree
1.02 0.0031
[0.0884] [0.0112]
R has College Degree or More
1.102 0.0156
[0.0973] [0.0115]
R Reports Race as Black
1.304*** 0.0455***
[0.130] [0.0165]
R Reports Race as “Other”
1.254 0.0392
[0.256] [0.0348]
R Reports Being Hispanic
1.077 0.0119
[0.165] [0.0200]
Census Region Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 9186
Mean Predicted Hazard 0.155
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ** significant at
10%
Note: Mean marginal effect represent the average impact of a one unit change on the predicted
hazard across the sample. Dummy variables for Northeast, Midwest, and West Census divisions
are also included. Only the Northeast division is significantly different from the South Census
division (negative relationship). 26
Table 5





Respondent (R) Has No 1.349** 0.0583**
Health Insurance [0.177] [0.0290]
R Buys Private, Non-group 1.242* 0.0406*
Health Insurance [0.149] [0.0246]
Unsubsidized Employer Provided 1.171 0.0289
Health Insurance [0.133] [0.0204]
R Has Health Insurance through a 0.293*** -0.217***





Mean Predicted Hazard 0.171
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ** significant at
10%
Note: Mean marginal effects represent the average impact of a one unit change on the predicted
hazard across the sample. “Subsidized” and “unsubsidized” EPHI refers to whether an employer
contributes to the payment of the premiums for employer provided health insurance (EPHI).
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Table 6
Survival Analysis of Unretirement Including In-retirement “Shocks”
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Hazard Ratio
Respondent (R) Has No 1.339** 1.365** 1.347** 1.290*
Health Insurance [0.175] [0.178] [0.177] [0.186]
R Buys Private, Non-group 1.223* 1.221* 1.233* 1.209
Health Insurance [0.147] [0.147] [0.148] [0.154]
R Has Unsubsidized Employer 1.154 1.162 1.172 1.124
Provided Health Insurance [0.132] [0.132] [0.133] [0.137]
R Has Health Insurance through a 0.290*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.291***
Governmental Program [0.0333] [0.0334] [0.0334] [0.0360]
Total Wealth Dropped Over 50% and More 1.251**
Than $10000 Since Previous Wave (PW) [0.112]
Housing Wealth Dropped Over 20% and 1.176**
More Than $10000 Since the PW [0.0908]
Non-housing Wealth Dropped Over 20% 1.136**
and More Than $10000 Since the PW [0.0736]
OOPM Expenses Rose at Least 50% 1.122 1.123
and by Over $2,000 Since the PW [0.0902] [0.0903]
R’s Household Size Decreased since 1.228**
the PW [0.103]
R’s Household Size Increased by 1.019
One since the PW [0.132]
R’s Household Size Increased by 1.394
Two or More since the PW [0.291]
R Felt Forced to Retire at 1.011
Retirement Wave (RW) [0.0832]
R was Received an Early 0.773**
Retirement Offer at RW [0.0977]
Demographic, Health,
Yes Yes Yes Yes
and Wealth Controls
Observations 9,115 9,115 9,115 8,308
Predicted Hazard Rate 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.165
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ** significant at
10%
Note: “Subsidized” and “unsubsidized” EPHI refers to whether an employer contributes to the
payment of the premiums for employer provided health insurance (EPHI). “OOPM” refers to out-
of-pocket medical expenditures. Sample is smaller in column [4] due to missing data regarding
retirement reasons and whether an Early Retirement Offer was made.
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Table 7
Analysis of Unretirement Based on Expectations of Retirement
[1] [2] [3] [4]
All All
No Planned Work Planned Work
in Retirement in Retirement
Respondent (R) Has No 1.366** 1.333** 0.84 1.528***
Health Insurance [0.199] [0.191] [0.324] [0.239]
R Buys Private, Non-group 1.216 1.2 0.605 1.371**
Health Insurance [0.157] [0.154] [0.214] [0.193]
R Has Unsubsidized Employer 1.237* 1.22 1.064 1.267
Provided Health Insurance [0.156] [0.155] [0.284] [0.185]
R Has Health Insurance through a 0.300*** 0.297*** 0.214*** 0.324***
Governmental Program [0.0374] [0.0369] [0.0557] [0.0461]
R Plans to do Paid Work in 1.655***
Retirement (Asked only in 1992) [0.151]
Demographic, Health,
Yes Yes Yes Yes
and Wealth Controls
Observations 8,070 8,070 2,395 5,675
Predicted Hazard Rate 0.163 0.165 0.104 0.191
Robust standard errors in brackets; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, ** significant at 10%
Note: “Subsidized” and “unsubsidized” EPHI refers to whether an employer contributes to the payment
of the premiums for employer provided health insurance (EPHI). “OOPM” refers to out-of-pocket
medical expenditures. Planned work in retirement question was only asked in the initial wave, 1992.
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